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Evidence
Geo. W. Pugh*
WITNESSES
Unresponsive Answers
Generally speaking, the failure to invoke a rule of evidence
results in a waiver.' As Professor McCormick puts it,2 counsel
may not "gamble upon the possibility of a favorable answer" to
an objectionable question, but must interpose an objection as
soon as the ground therefor becomes apparent. Normally, the
ground for objection will be apparent in the question, but of
course this is not always the case. The answer, for example, may
be unresponsive, and its inadmissible nature not previously dis-
closed.
In State v. Donaldson,3 defense counsel had objected to a
statement by a state's witness in response to a question by the
district attorney, and urged that the statement was so prejudi-
cial that a mistrial should be ordered. Although the trial court
sustained the objection and admonished the jury to disregard
the statement, it found that the remark was gratuitous and un-
responsive, and denied the motion for mistrial. In affirming
the action of the trial court, the Supreme Court stated: "We find
no error in this ruling. The law is well settled and has been often
stated by this Court to the effect that the trial for a criminal
offense cannot be defeated or nullified by the act of a witness in
volunteering an objectionable remark for which the prosecution
is not responsible."'4
HEARSAY
The line of demarcation between hearsay and non-hearsay is
sometimes shadowy and obscure., An extra-judicial statement
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Faculty Editor, Louisiana
Law Review.
1. 1 WIOMORE, EvmENcE 321, § 18 (1940).
2. McCoRMsIcK, EVIDENCE 115, § 52 (1954). See also Ladd, Common Mistakes
in the Technique of Trial, 22 IOWA L. REV. 609, 622-26 (1937).
3. 238 La. 265, 115 So.2d 345 (1959).
4. Id. at 268-69, 115 So.2d at 346.
5. For able discussions of the matter, see McCormick, The Borderland of
Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489 (1930) and Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as
Reflected in Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 611 (1954).
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may sometimes be offered not to prove the truth of the out-of-
court assertion, but merely the fact that such an assertion was
made. If the fact that the out-of-court utterance was made has
an independent relevance and the risk that the trier of fact will
ascribe undue weight to the evidence is comparatively slight,
then the statement is frequently admissible as non-hearsay.
When, in a given case, the trier of fact is a judge rather than a
jury, the risk of misuse of an out-of-court statement offered as
non-hearsay (the risk that the statement will be given more than
its logical weight) is of course reduced. This may explain why
out-of-court statements which would be held inadmissible in a
case tried by a common law jury are sometimes held admissible
in a case tried to a judge alone.
A principle that fits hand-in-glove with the hearsay rule is
the requirement that a witness have first-hand knowledge of
the fact of which he speaks - not mere hearsay knowledge. If
the fact to which he is testifying is an out-of-court statement
which has independent relevance, and the witness himself ac-
tually heard the out-of-court statement uttered, then of course
the requirement of first-hand knowledge is met.
In Southwest Natural Production Co. v. Anderson," the Su-
preme Court in reviewing the decision of the district court in a
civil case tried to a judge sitting without a jury reflected a
willingness to consider statements which might well be con-
sidered inadmissible in a case tried to a common law jury.7
Confessions
In State v. Brauner, the Supreme Court reversed a narcotics
conviction because it found that there was at least "considerable
and reasonable doubt.., that defendant's confessions were free
and voluntary."9 Article 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure"
prohibits the introduction of a confession unless it is affirma-
tively shown that the same was free and voluntary, and "not
made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces,
threats, inducements or promises." In the instant case, the court
reaffirmed the position taken in State v. Ellis. that if there
6. 239 La. 490, 118 So.2d 897 (1960).
7. See also Wells v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 239 La. 662, 119 So.2d 501
(1960).
8. 239 La. 651, 119 So.2d 497 (1960).
9. Id. at 660, 119 So.2d at 500.
10. LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950).
11. 207 La. 812, 22 So.2d 181 (1945).
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is any reasonable doubt that a proper confession was freely and
voluntarily made, it must be excluded. A police officer had testi-
fied that he had told the defendant that if he surrendered the
narcotics and would cooperate with the officers in apprehending
the supplier, they would so inform the district attorney, and
that possibly, in the discretion of the district attorney, defend-
ant might be given a suspended sentence. This statement, the
court found, might well have prompted the defendant to con-
fess, and the fact that defendant never fulfilled a condition of
the officer's proposal "could not possibly serve to render volun-
tary confessions that were otherwise involuntary." 12 Following
the Gebbia 8 and Simpson14 cases, the court also stated that
facts which have been discovered as a result of confessions found
to have been improperly obtained are nonetheless admissible.
Thus, the state may employ the fruits of a confession, even
though it may not introduce the confession itself.
Documentary Evidence
In Southern Scrap Material Co. v. Commercial Scrap Mate-
rial Corp.,' the defendant contended that certain letters written
to it by the plaintiff were self-serving declarations and should
not be considered. The Supreme Court noted that no objection
had been urged to the production of the documents. Since the
letters were apparently relevant, the court's remarks concerning
the failure of the defendant to interpose an objection to admissi-
bility would seemingly have sufficed to dispose of defendant's
contentions. 18 However, the court went further and stated:
"Furthermore, the truth of the statements made in these com-
munications was established by witnesses who had knowledge
of the facts. Where the truth of statements made in a written
communication is established by witnesses having knowledge
of the facts, the communication is not objectionable as being
hearsay or a self-serving declaration." 7 The validity of the
quoted statements seems open to serious question. If the facts
contained in a document, to which a proper hearsay objection
has been made and overruled, are indeed established by witnesses
who had actual knowledge of the facts, then the trial court's
12. 239 La. 651, 660, 119 So.2d 497, 500 (1960).
13. 121 La. 1083, 47 So. 32 (1908).
14. 157 La. 614, 102 So. 810 (1925).
15. 239 La. 958, 120 So.2d 491 (1960).
16. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
17. 239 La. 958, 964-65, 120 So.2d 491, 494 (1960).
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erroneous ruling would normally be harmless error. But the
hearsay character of a proffered document is not altered by
the fact that statements contained in it have been established by
proper evidence.18
18. The cases cited by the court, Lado v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 182 La.
726, 162 So. 579 (1935) and Succession of Bell, 194 La. 274, 193 So. 645 (1940),
would seem properly to stand merely for the well-recognized proposition that the
failure of a party to interpose an objection to the admissibility of evidence gen-
erally results in a waiver of the objection. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
